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SMEs IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Asia and the Pacific is a region of contrasts. The region as a whole has achieved 
unprecedented growth and development in recent decades. The general picture, however, 
hides a great diversity of economies, development experiences, and challenges. Asia is 
increasingly playing the role of a global growth pole, and is fast emerging as a manufacturing 
and information technology hub of the world economy. Yet the World Bank estimates that 
more than 900 million people still live in extreme poverty, now defined as less than $1.25 a 
day. Asia is the home of China and India—giants that are reshaping international business 
and the global economy through, among other things, the operations of internationally 
competitive enterprises such as Lenovo (China) and Infosys (India); but such giants also 
coexist with a large number of traditional, local micro- and small enterprises. In addition, 
China  and  India  share  this  vast  continent  with  Bhutan,  Nepal  and  the  Lao  People’s 
Democratic Republic, all considered least developed countries, and the region includes 
the small island nations of the Pacific, whose prospects for development also remain far 
more limited.  
One characteristic of this vast and diverse region is the presence and importance 
of a large SME sector comprising the majority of enterprises in all the region’s economies. 
Given the region’s diversity, enterprises in general, and SMEs in particular, are at different 
stages of evolution in their respective economies; their relative roles and contributions 
also  differ.  Thus,  the  constraints  they  face  and  the  corresponding  policies  aimed  at 
strengthening their competitive performance are expected to vary. Nevertheless, there are 
also basic similarities in the broad challenges faced by SMEs in the region, for example in 
terms of access to finance, technology, human resources, market information and, above 
all, in adjusting to both the opportunities and threats of globalization. 
1.1.  Definitions and profiles
SMEs are a source of employment, competition, economic dynamism, 
and innovation; they stimulate the entrepreneurial spirit and the diffusion of 
skills. Because they enjoy a wider geographical presence than big companies, 
SMEs also contribute to better income distribution.
Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (Panitchpakdi 2006)
Most people have a broad sense of what constitutes an SME, if only a rather 
stereotypical  image  of  a  young  and  relatively  fragile  business.  In  many  cases,  that 
stereotype indeed holds true. Like any stereotype, however, it is neither the full picture nor 
universally correct. There is a temptation to liken SMEs to the student generation of the 
corporate community, containing considerable growth potential, if only their energy and 
enthusiasm can be harnessed and channelled in the right direction. Pushing the analogy 
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further, some SMEs will go on to great things in later life, while most will probably achieve 
more modest goals, and sadly some will come to a premature end for one reason or another.
Most policymakers and development practitioners deem the health of the SME 
community  to  be  highly  important  for  an  economy,  whether  subnational,  national  or 
regional. Not only do SMEs typically constitute the vast majority of company registrations 
in any economy, there is also the expectation that an elite few will make the leap “from 
garage to great”. The likes of Microsoft and Apple Inc. serve as living proof that the 
“American Dream” of SME development is no fantasy; it can be done, given the right set of 
factors and conditions. Here in Asia, Infosys of India was started with capital of just $250, 
but has risen to become a business with revenues of $4 billion, and is listed on NASDAQ 
in the United States of America.
Similarly, the bursting of the “dot.com” bubble in 2001 provides evidence that perils 
also abound for new SMEs that seek to pursue unviable business models (and for the 
investors that inject equity capital into them). There can be value destruction as well as 
value creation.
The main ingredients that make up factors and conditions conducive for SME sector 
development are increasingly well known and understood by policymakers and economic 
practitioners. Some of the fundamental ingredients of a benign enabling environment for 
SMEs are perennial in nature and will always hold true, particularly at the start-up stage. 
But it must also be recognized that SMEs do not operate in splendid isolation, and are 
not divorced from a constantly changing global business environment. The factors that 
made “SME X” successful in country A may not pertain to “SME Y” in country B. Similarly, 
the conditions that made “SME A” successful in “199X” may not pertain to “SME B” in 
“200Y”. Some of the pro-SME policy formulas are fairly generic and constant, and some 
are more specific and ever-changing. Just as SMEs themselves have to keep up-to-date 
with changing business practices (and technologies) if they want to remain commercially 
successful, so too must policymakers and development agencies ensure that their pro-
SME prescriptions are contemporary, if they want their strategies to remain relevant and 
useful.  
For  developing  and  transitional  economies  in  particular,  SME  development 
holds the added allure of being a key component of wider economic development and 
poverty alleviation. The SME community is seen as a major and sustainable generator 
of employment and income (and therefore tax revenues) for citizens working outside 
of the State sector. In the case of transitional economies, although many State-owned 
enterprises can also be SMEs, SME development is broadly synonymous with private 
sector development. In developing countries, SMEs can also serve as a useful bridge 
between the informal economy of family enterprise and the formalized corporate sector. 
Some of a country’s more able SMEs may also be a source of foreign exchange earnings, 
if they are able to meet the quality and quantity standards required to export their products 
or services overseas.
There is also a tendency to believe that a vibrant SME sector helps promote 
competition and a culture of entrepreneurship, which are both conducive for economic 
growth. Further, SMEs are often seen as being nimble and agile, and more willing to 
innovate than their larger and more well-established peers, as they navigate the frontiers 
of business activity. Youth versus experience. David versus Goliath. This is particularly 3
true of entrepreneur-driven SMEs, typically seeking to exploit business opportunities, 
as they can “… drive structural transformation [of an economy and corporate sector] 
through innovation, provision of intermediate inputs and services (which permits greater 
specialization  in  manufacturing),  and  by  increasing  employment  and  productivity  …” 
(Gries and Naudé 2008a, 1). Thus, some of the more innovative and dynamic SMEs 
can serve as catalysts in transforming developing economies in various structural ways, 
including advances up the value chain. The economic transformation of Taiwan Province 
of China is often viewed in this context.
It is important, however, to recognize that as yet there is no hard empirical evidence 
to support the assertion that the presence of SMEs in an economy will automatically 
deliver economic growth, nor alleviate poverty or lessen income inequality.1 SMEs are 
not a magic bullet for poverty alleviation, and they are not specifically pro-poor, contrary 
to popular belief. Rather, a more modest claim can be made, namely that the size of the 
SME sector in an economy does appear to be positively associated (if not quite correlated) 
with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth in many countries. Strong SME 
sectors do not necessarily drive economic growth, but they are “characteristic of fast-
growing economies” (Gries and Naudé 2008a, 1). That said, there is clear recognition of 
the importance of SMEs in job creation—a key dimension of the development process, 
particularly in the lagging economies of Asia and the Pacific.
1.1.1.  What exactly is an SME ?
Definitions of what constitutes an SME vary quite widely from country to country 
and even within single countries, depending on the business sector concerned.2 Thus, 
there is no universal determinant or criteria of an SME. Much depends on the character 
of the relevant host country, and the profile of its own particular corporate sector, from 
which  a  relative  measure  of  an  SME  is  then  typically  made,  sometimes  on  a  rather 
arbitrary basis. Some countries just use the number of employees as the sole criteria for 
determining whether a business is an SME or not. Other countries use this same criterion, 
plus an additional criterion based on either the value of the firm’s assets or the size of 
revenues, typically denominated in the local currency.3 In cases where a currency value 
is cited (either for assets or revenues), any marked inflation can pose a problem for the 
SME definition over time. The criteria for SMEs are updated in some countries from time 
to time.
The form of ownership profile, type of legal entity, or general provenance of the 
company are typically deemed irrelevant when creating the definition. Thus, while an 
SME is typically thought of as a locally owned and privately held business, there is no 
reason why it may not be a State-owned or foreign-invested enterprise. Some countries 
will distinguish between a microenterprise and a small enterprise, while others—by not 
setting a floor for SME size—effectively include microenterprises within their SME umbrella 
definition (this is the case in Viet Nam). The above notwithstanding, most SME definitions 
pertain to businesses that are formal in nature and have been registered in some manner, 
and exclude small-scale, informal family enterprises.
1  See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2005). As the number of SMEs rise, one should not expect the 
Gini coefficient to automatically go down.
2   The Government of Malaysia provides a good example of this multisector breakdown of the SME 
definition. See its “Definitions for small and medium sized enterprises in Malaysia”, September 2005.
3   Cambodia is a notable exception, in that its definition uses United States dollars, not the riel, as the 
currency of measure.4
Table 1 serves to give a sense of the diversity of SME definitions in the Asia-Pacific 
region alone; table 2 provides the European Union definition for comparison.
a As cited in the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (Pakistan) website (www.smeda.org.
pk/main.php?id=2).
Table 1.  Some differing definitions of SMEs in South-East Asia
Country Definition
Cambodia
Firms  that  employ  between  11  and  50  employees  and  have  fixed 
assets of $50,000 to $250,000 are categorized as small. Firms with 51-
200 employees and fixed assets of $250,000 to $500,000 are medium-
sized. Source: SME Development Framework of 2005.
Indonesia Fewer than 100 employees.a
Lao  People’s 
Democratic 
Republic
“Small enterprises are those having an annual average number of 
employees not exceeding 19 persons or total assets not exceeding 
two hundred and fifty million kip or an annual turnover not exceeding 
four hundred million kip”.
“Medium sized enterprises are those having an annual average number 
of employees not exceeding 99 persons or total assets not exceeding 
one billion two hundred million kip or an annual turnover not exceeding 
one 1 billion kip”.
Malaysia
Depends  on  the  business  sector.  Different  criteria,  based  on  the 
number  of  employees  and  annual  sales  turnover.  For  details,  see 
www.smeinfo.com.my/pdf/sme_definitions_ENGLISH.pdf. 
Philippines Fewer than 200 employees, and less than P 40 million in assets.a
Thailand
Depends on the business sector. Different criteria, based on number of 
employees and fixed capital size. For details see http://cms.sme.go.th/
cms/web/homeeng. 
Viet Nam
SMEs are independent production and business establishments that 
are duly registered according to the current law provisions, each with 
registered capital not exceeding VND 10 billion or annual labour not 
exceeding 300 people.
Sources:  Cambodia, SME Development Framework of 2005 (Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy).
  Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Decree 42/PM on the Promotion and Development of Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprises (Vientiane, 2004), art. 2.
  Malaysia, Definitions for Small and Medium Enterprises in Malaysia  (Secretariat to National SME 
Development Council and Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005), available at www.smeinfo.com.my/pdf/
sme_definitions_ENGLISH.pdf.
  Viet Nam, Decree on Support for Development of Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (Hanoi, 
Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2001), chap. 1, art. 35
Perhaps the one common denominator is that SMEs typically make up more than 
90 per cent of all registered enterprises in any country. Thus, in terms of the number 
of incorporations at least—if not always in terms of aggregate asset size or cumulative 
productivity—SMEs tend to dominate the corporate community. Economies differ, however, 
in the extent to which they rely on SMEs to generate a greater or lesser proportion of total 
output.
1.1.2.   SMEs in Asia and the Pacific: a profile of the corporate landscape
As noted earlier, SMEs tend to dominate the corporate community in all countries, 
at least in terms of company registrations, if not always in terms of aggregate size. In less 
developed countries, for example Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Nepal, SMEs represent the vast bulk of the corporate sector. And even at the other end of 
the economic spectrum in Asia, in Japan for example, SMEs account for about 99 per cent 
of all firms, 70 per cent of total employment and 50 per cent of GDP output. SMEs play an 
important economic role in virtually all countries, albeit to varying degrees, and it is their 
relationship with other elements of the corporate community—including foreign-invested 
enterprises and large domestic corporations (whether State-owned or private)—that is 
often a critical determinant of their long-term success. Mutually beneficial linkages are 
typically established between these various elements of the corporate community.  
This  is  not  a  static  arrangement.  Rather,  it  is  a  fluid  set  of  relationships  that 
mutate over time, as individual SMEs and other business organizations inevitably wax 
and wane. This is particularly true of SMEs that are driven by entrepreneurs, typically 
seeking to exploit an opportunity that they have perceived to exist. And it is the “innovative 
tension” that arises which drives an economy forward; hence the crucial importance of 
property rights (including intellectual property rights). In the context of developing and less 
developed economies, Gries and Naudé (2008a), in the context of an endogenous growth 
model they developed,  depict the role played by entrepreneur-driven SMEs in advancing 
an economy thus:
In essence the transformation from a low-income, traditional economy to a modern 
economy … involves significant changes to production methods, a process of 
change where … entrepreneurs provide essential roles: first, in creating new firms 
outside of the household, second by absorbing surplus labour from the traditional 








Medium-sized < 250 ≤ 50 million ≤ 43 million
Small < 50 ≤ 10 million ≤ 10 million
Micro < 10 ≤ 2 million ≤ 2 million
Table 2. Just for comparison: the European Union definition of an SME
Source:   European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition 
of  micro,  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
enterprise_policy/sme_definition/index_en.htm.6
firms, fourth by permitting greater specialization  in manufacturing, and fifth by 
raising productivity and employment in both the modern and traditional sectors. 
(Gries and Naudé 2008a, 25)
This is not to dismiss the crucial role played by foreign-invested enterprises, and 
large domestic firms too, in advancing a developing economy. But it does recognize the 
important role played by more innovative SMEs, and acknowledges that they are not 
passive spectators sitting on the sidelines of an economic development exercise from 
which they are largely divorced. 
However, the ability of more innovative SMEs to perform this economic function is 
significantly determined by the business environment in which they are obliged to operate. 
Without conducive conditions—the right kind of business enabling environment—in which 
to develop and grow, SMEs are likely to remain: (a) bonsai-like in stature; and (b) much 
less dynamic in their actions. This explains in large part why attention is often placed on 
various global indices and indicators that attempt to measure and compare the business 
environments in different countries. The better indices have a genuine benefit in identifying 
issues and comparing them across countries, as a basic form of diagnostic analysis.
1.1.3. Enabling environments for SMEs in the Asia-Pacific region
Although not specific to the SME sector, the World Bank’s annual Doing Business 
rankings comprise perhaps the most comprehensive survey of economies (181 in the 
latest  iteration)  and  their  differing  business  conditions.  Briefly,  the  Doing  Business 
exercise seeks to quantify and rate the ease of doing business in a country, based on 10 
components, comprising: (a) starting a business; (b) dealing with construction permits; (c) 
employing workers; (d) registering property; (e) getting credit; (f) protecting investors; (g) 
paying taxes; (h) trading across borders; (i) enforcing contracts; and (j) closing a business. 
Although there is some debate as to the methodological approach used for this exercise, 
the findings are useful in indicative terms and in spotlighting where a country’s main areas 
of strength and weakness lie, in terms of doing business. Table 3 shows the aggregate 
Doing Business 2009 rankings for Asia-Pacific economies covered.7
Economy Rank Economy Rank
Singapore 1 Brunei 88
New Zealand 2 Solomon Islands 89
Hong Kong, China 4 Palau 91
Australia 9 Viet Nam 92
Japan 12 Marshall Islands 93
Thailand 13 Papua New Guinea 95
Malaysia 20 Sri Lanka 102
Republic of Korea  23 Bangladesh 110
Azerbaijan 33 Nepal  121
Fiji 39 India 122





Taiwan Province of China 61 Indonesia 129
Samoa 64 Cambodia 135
Kyrgyzstan  68 Uzbekistan 138
Maldives 69 Philippines 140
Kazakhstan 70 Tajikistan 159





China 83 Timor-Leste 170
Table 3. Doing Business 2009: aggregate rankings for Asia-Pacific economies
Source:  World Bank, Doing Business 2009 (Washington D.C., 2009).
A similar exercise of sorts is conducted by the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom 
of the World Exercise, which has been running for over 20 years and now spans 141 
economies. Essentially it is an index that seeks to measure economic freedom in an 
economy across five principal components, most of which are pertinent to SMEs and the 
business sector as a whole.4 The latest report, published in 2008, analyses data for 2006, 
and ranks Asia-Pacific economies as shown in table 4.
4   The five components are: (a) size of government; (b) legal structure and security of property rights;   
(c) access to sound money; (d) freedom to trade internationally; and (e) regulation of credit, labour and 
business.8
Table 4.  Economic freedom: rankings for Asia-Pacific economies
Economy Rank Economy Rank
Hong Kong, China 1 India 77
Singapore 2 Fiji 83
New Zealand 3 Papua New Guinea 87
Australia 8 China 93
Taiwan Province of China 18 Indonesia 101
Japan 27 Sri Lanka 103
Republic of Korea  29 Pakistan 104
Kazakhstan 42 Bangladesh 108 
(joint)
Mongolia 43 Viet Nam 108 
(joint)
Thailand 56 Azerbaijan 118
Kyrgyzstan 60 Nepal 128
Malaysia 72 Myanmar 139
Philippines 73
Source:   James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, with the assistance of Joshua Hall, Economic Freedom of 
the World: 2008 Annual Report (Economic Freedom Network, 2008).
While not all of the elements within this particular index’s five components are 
entirely pertinent to SME sector development, some very much are, including (but not 
limited to):
(a) the size of government in business (which relates to “crowding out” issues);
(b) property rights protection;
(c) legal enforcement of contracts;
(d) freedom to hold foreign currency;
(e) regulator trade barriers;
(f) taxes imposed on international trade;
(g) private sector credit;
(h) hiring and firing regulations;
(i) price controls;
(j) starting a business and licensing restrictions;
(k) bribes and extra payments.9
For each of the 141 economies covered by the index, a detailed breakdown is 
conducted. More than 40 separate numerical ratings are applied, which allows one to: 
(a) undertake a diagnostic of where a specific economy is faring less well; (b) make 
cross-economy  comparisons;  and  (c)  monitor  a  single  economy’s  performance  over 
time, across any of the 42 elements that are measured by the index. For example, Viet 
Nam ranks relatively high in terms of “freedom to trade internationally” and “regulation of 
credit, labour and business”. However, it scores worst on the “access to sound money” 
component, which then drags down its aggregate ranking.
Thirdly, there is the Global Competitiveness Index. Like the previous two indices, 
this index does not focus on SMEs per se, but measures a range of issues that are highly 
pertinent to SME development, namely “the set of institutions, policies and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of a country” (Sala-i-Martin and others 2008, 3). Briefly, 
as discussed in The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 (Sala-i-Martin and others 
2008), the World Competitiveness Index tracks 12 pillars of economic competitiveness, 
which are grouped into three elements. The first element contains four pillars that are 
essential for a factor-driven economy, namely: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic 
stability, and health and primary education. The second element contains six pillars that are 
essential for an efficiency-driven economy, namely: higher education and training, goods 
market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological 
readiness, and market size. And the final element contains two pillars that are essential for 
an innovation-driven economy, comprising: business sophistication and innovation. 
Table 5 shows the rankings for the Asia-Pacific economies included in the Global 
Competitiveness Index.
Table 5.  Global Competitiveness Index: rankings for Asia-Pacific economies
Economy Rank Economy Rank
Singapore 5 Kazakhstan 66
Japan 9 Viet Nam 70
Hong Kong, China 11 Philippines 71
Republic of Korea  13 Sri Lanka 77
Taiwan Province of China 17 Mongolia 100
Australia 18 Pakistan 101
Malaysia 21 Cambodia 109
New Zealand 24 Bangladesh 111
China 30 Tajikistan 116
Thailand 34 Kyrgyzstan  122
Brunei 39 Nepal 126
India 50 Timor-Leste 129
Indonesia 55
Source:  Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Jennifer Blanke, Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz, Thierry Geiger, Irene Mia and 
Fiona Paua, “The Global Competitive Index: Prioritizing the Economic Policy Agenda”, in Michael 
E. Porter and Klaus Schwab, eds., Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 (World Economic 
Forum, Geneva, 2008), table 3, p. 10.10
An  interesting,  and  relatively  recent,  development  has  been  the  creation  of 
subnational  indices,  such  as  the  Provincial  Competitiveness  Index  in  Viet  Nam,  and 
an off-shoot of this in Cambodia.5 Such an approach recognizes that most SMEs have 
relatively limited relationships with national agencies and the like, and that they interface 
rather with municipal or provincial bodies, and conduct their activities largely or entirely 
within that sphere. Thus, the Provincial Competitiveness Index seeks to measure and 
rank the business conditions—allowing for “initial conditions”, such as natural-resource 
endowments—for private sector development in each of the 64 provinces of Viet Nam. 
Such an exercise is highly pertinent to SME development, as it focuses on 10 principal 
factors that impact SMEs, comprising: (a) costs of market entry; (b) access to land and 
security of tenure; (c) issues relating to the transparency of regulations and their enactment 
by provincial bodies; (d) the time required to be compliant with regulations; (e) informal 
charges imposed; (f) bias towards State-owned enterprises; (g) the proactivity of provincial 
authorities to assist firms; (h) the provision of private sector development services; (i) the 
availability of training for employees; and (j) the quality of legal institutions.
In  the  case  of  Cambodia,  a  provincial  business  environment  scorecard  was 
developed,  spanning  the  country’s  10  most  economically  active  provinces.  Like  the 
Provincial  Competitiveness  Index  in  Viet  Nam,  10  sub-indices  were  developed  for 
measuring the enabling environment in these provinces, but tailored to meet the slightly 
different  conditions  in  Cambodia,  including,  among  others:  tax  administration,  crime 
prevention and dispute resolution.
1.2. Market entries, survival, prosperity and exits
Nobody talks about entrepreneurship as survival, but that’s exactly what 
it is and what nurtures creative thinking.
 Anita Roddick, founder of The Body Shop6
Let  us  now  turn  to  SME  development,  and  policymaking  in  support  of  that 
development process, as it pertains to four stages in the SME life cycle: market entry, 
survival, possible prosperity, and ultimate exit. Some SMEs may encounter just one or 
two of these stages (such as entry and exit), while other SMEs may experience all four 
stages. Policymakers typically pay the most attention to market entry, and relatively less 
effort is expended on the latter stages, for understandable reasons. But this asymmetry 
in the focus of most SME development can be misguided in some cases. For example, 
too much emphasis on removing market-entry obstacles alone can, over time, result in 
diminishing returns for policymakers and development partners. Rather, there needs to 
be a balanced portfolio of interventions that can assist SMEs in overcoming obstacles 
throughout their development trajectory.
There are varying perspectives on the relationship and delineation between SMEs 
5   The Provincial Competitiveness Index in Viet Nam was developed by The Asia Foundation as part of the 
Viet Nam Competitiveness Initiative funded by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). The Cambodia variant was also developed by The Asia Foundation, with support from the 
International Finance Corporation-Mekong Project Development Facility and the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID).
6  www.anitaroddick.com. 11
and entrepreneurs, and thus between SME development and entrepreneurial development 
initiatives. Most start-up ventures tend to be small, and therefore much of the policy-
related literature pertaining to entrepreneurship is also highly relevant to SMEs. That said, 
SME development and entrepreneurship support are not wholly synonymous. An SME 
can be entrepreneurial in its endeavours, but this is not universal. For example, an SME 
that has been established out of necessity or that is a long-established family business 
(common in countries where the legal protection of property and investor rights is weak) 
differs significantly from an individual or individuals pursuing a very specific perceived 
business opportunity.7
For entrepreneurialism to be vibrant in an economy, a willingness by individuals to 
take (calculated) business risks must also be present. If the social stigma associated with 
business failure is perceived to be too great, or the practical repercussions of business 
closure are too onerous (for example, if the difficulty or cost of closing a company is 
too great), then entrepreneurialism will not flourish easily. In addition, the right kinds of 
economic incentives need to be in place to prompt potential entrepreneurs to take a leap 
into the unknown. If the prospect of relatively substantial financial gain is a dim one, then 
the motivation to venture will no doubt be constrained. That in turn necessitates that the 
development of new products and services can be monetized (translated into a source 
of  income)  in  some  manner  by  new  business  ventures.  But  in  developing  countries, 
where incomes are often low, and thus consumer spending power is limited, and where 
intellectual property right protection is often inadequate, this can be a real problem.  
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor sees entrepreneurial endeavour evolving in 
different ways, depending on the economic stage of the host economy. First, for a less 
developed, factor-driven economy, the shift from agricultural sector dominance to greater 
industrial activity creates a dynamic described as follows in the 2008 Executive Report of 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 
As extractive industry starts to develop, this triggers economic growth, prompting 
surplus population from agriculture to migrate toward extractive and emergent 
scale-intensive sectors, which are often located in specific regions. The resulting 
oversupply of labour feeds subsistence entrepreneurship in regional agglomerations, 
as surplus workers seek to create self-employment opportunities in order to make 
a living. (Bosma and others 2008, 8)
Secondly, for a developing, efficiency-driven economy, the development of the 
industrial sector creates new venture opportunities that can be harnessed by entrepreneurs, 
thus:
As the industrial sector develops further, institutions start to emerge to support 
further industrialization and the build-up of scale in the pursuit of higher productivity 
through economies of scale. Typically, national economic policies in scale-intensive 
economies shape their emerging economic and financial institutions to favor large 
national businesses. As increasing economic productivity contributes to financial 
capital formation, niches may open in industrial supply chains that service these 
7  Entrepreneurial  initiatives  are  sometimes  said  to  go  through  at  least  four  stages:  (a)  conception  or   
identification;  (b)  gestation  or  evaluation;  (c)  infancy  or  explosion;  and  (d)  adolescence  or 
exploitation. 12
national incumbents. This, combined with the opening up of independent supply of 
financial capital from the emerging banking sector, would expand opportunities for 
the development of small-scale and medium-sized manufacturing sectors. (Bosma 
and others 2008, 8)
And finally, in an industrialized, innovation-driven economy, a third pro-entrepreneur 
dynamic usually becomes apparent, thus:
The  industrial  sector  evolves  and  experiences  improvements  in  variety  and 
sophistication. Such a development would be typically associated with increasing 
research  and  development  and  knowledge  intensity,  as  knowledge-generating 
institutions in the economy gain momentum. This development opens the way for 
the development of innovative, opportunity-seeking entrepreneurial activity that is 
not afraid to challenge established incumbents in the economy. Often, small and 
innovative entrepreneurial firms enjoy an innovation productivity advantage over 
large incumbents, enabling them to operate as ‘agents of creative destruction.’ To 
the extent that the economic and financial institutions created during the scale-
intensive phase of the economy are able to accommodate and support opportunity-
seeking entrepreneurial activity, innovative entrepreneurial firms may emerge as 
significant drivers of economic growth and wealth creation. (Bosma and others 
2008, 8)
Not  surprisingly  perhaps,  views  differ  widely  (Wennekers  and  Thurik  1999; 
Davidsson 2004; Godin and others 2008) on what are the key elements necessary to 
promote entrepreneurial endeavour in an economy. But clearly, the kind of “hothouse 
environment” necessary to seed, pollinate, nurture and harvest entrepreneurial initiatives 
is not easy to achieve, particularly in countries where government resources are limited. 
Even the advanced and affluent city-State of Singapore has had only mixed success in 
its relatively recent forays into developing a more vibrant and entrepreneurial business 
community, despite being able to apply quite considerable financial resources to this effort 
(see, for example, the website of SPRING Singapore at www.spring.gov.sg). Government 
funding initiatives in support of SME development (both debt and equity) in Singapore 
include the SPRING Startup Enterprise Development Scheme, Business Angels Scheme, 
Growth  Financing  Programme,  Micro-Loan  Programme,  Local  Enterprise  Finance 
Scheme, Loan Insurance Scheme, Export Coverage Scheme (trade credit insurance), 
and the Internationalisation Finance Scheme.
Furthermore, Singapore is part of a relatively elite group of economies in the Asia-
Pacific region with a strong industry of private sector fund management that can also 
pursue the venture capital/private equity support of the SME sector. One recent example 
is the S$30 million Sirius SME Growth Partners I fund, focused exclusively on SMEs 
located in the city-State. Launched in May 2008, with an initial closing of S$15 million, it 
aims to invest S$2 million-3 million in about 10-12 “growth and expansion-stage SMEs in 
various industries, who can be leaders in their respective fields” (see www.sirius.com.sg/
Sirius_growth_fund.html). Exit is likely to be through trade sales or a listing on Singapore’s 
secondary market for smaller enterprises.
This underlines the extent to which multiple economic, financial, industrial, social, 
cultural and other nuances are sometimes necessary, in addition to the basic regulatory 
structures and economic platform. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor cites a cocktail 13
of:  (a)  entrepreneurial  attitudes;  (b)  entrepreneurial  activity;  and  (c)  entrepreneurial 
aspiration, which it then seeks to quantify through a series of analytical measures.8 The 
consortium goes on to propose what it calls the Entrepreneurial Framework Conditions, 
which tend to differ, depending on the stage of the underlying economy, as discussed 
earlier (see figure 1).
It needs to be underlined, however, that SME development and entrepreneurial 
development are not synonymous. Many (and probably most) SMEs are not entrepreneurial 
in nature. Rather, entrepreneurial business ventures often tend to be a subset of the 
SME sector, and are perhaps the most attractive to policymakers, given the prospect or 
potential they have for contributing most to economic growth and development.
1.2.1.  Entry: what does it take to set up an SME?
The first critical stage in the development of an SME is that of market entry, or 
start-up. This entails all the steps and procedures to get a business up and running in 
compliance with the laws and regulations of the host country. There are typically two 
important factors in this regard: (a) the time is takes to start up a business; and (b) the cost 
8  Sadly, in the latest iteration of the Global Economic Monitor study, only two Asia-Pacific economies 
(Republic of Korea and Japan) were among the 43 countries taking part.
Source:   Niels  Bosma,  Zoltan  J.  Acs,  Erkko  Autio,  Alicia  Coduras  and  Jonathan  Levie,  Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor 2008 Executive Report (Global Entrepreneurship Research Consortium, 
2009) available at www.gemconsortium.org/download/1240814294671/GEM_Global_08.pdf.
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of doing so. Unreasonable waiting times and/or prohibitive costs can be major barriers 
for many potential new businesses, and can translate into a potentially major opportunity 
cost for the economy, in terms of, among other things, jobs foregone and income not 
generated. Within the Asia-Pacific region, Azerbaijan is recognized as one developing 
country that has made considerable improvements in its regulatory framework relating to 
start-up.9
But these are certainly not the only potential inhibitors to greater SME start-up 
rates. For example, if an entrepreneur is unable to gain access to the capital needed 
to finance the planned business venture, he or she may opt not to proceed. Another 
inhibitor can actually be found at the opposite end of the SME life cycle: closure. If the 
regulations pertaining to shutting down a business or bankruptcy are too onerous, then 
an entrepreneur may be unwilling to take the risk of establishing an SME, given the risks 
attendant with any new business, and the possibility of failure resulting in a gratuitously 
arduous process of legal closure.
While the obstacle posed by high costs of market entry can be easily understood, 
the obstacle posed by a time-consuming process is perhaps a little less apparent. For 
some business ventures, the timing of market entry can be an important determinant of 
success. If a business opportunity opens, but subsequently closes (for whatever reason) 
before all the regulatory hurdles associated with start-up are completed, then it is likely 
that fewer SMEs will be established. Returning to the Doing Business rankings again, 
table 6 shows the figures for Asia-Pacific economies covered by the survey, in terms of 
the ease of starting a business. This indicator is aimed at measuring the bureaucratic 
and regulatory hurdles that an entrepreneur must typically navigate through in order to 
incorporate a new firm that employs up to 50 staff and has start-up capital that is 10 times 
the per capita gross national income of the relevant country. There are some striking 
contrasts to be discerned, most noticeably in the number of days required to commence 
a business, which ranges from 1 to 116 days.  
9  See the starting-a-business case study on Azerbaijan produced by the Doing Business project: Svetlana 
Bagaudinova, Dahlia Khalifa and Givi Petriashvili, “Azerbaijan business registration agencies cooperate 
on a new one-stop-shop”, in Bruce Ross-Larson, ed., Celebrating Reform (Washington D.C., International 
Finance Corporation, World Bank and USAID, 2008).












Average for East Asia and the Pacific 8.6 44.2 32.3
Average for South Asia 7.4 32.5 31.9
Afghanistan 4 9 59.5
Australia 2 2 0.8
Azerbaijan 6 16 3.2
Bangladesh 7 73 25.7
Bhutan 8 46 8.515
Brunei 18 116 9.2
Cambodia 9 85 151.7
China 14 40 8.4
Fiji 8 46 25.2
Hong Kong, China 5 11 2.0
India 13 30 70.1
Indonesia 11 76 77.9
Japan 8 23 7.5
Kazakhstan 8 21 5.2
Kiribati 6 21 64.6
Kyrgyzstan  4 15 7.4
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 8 103 14.1
Malaysia 9 13 14.7
Maldives 5 9 11.5
Marshall Islands 5 17 17.3
Micronesia (Federated States of) 7 16 137.5
Mongolia 7 13 4.0
Nepal 7 31 60.2
New Zealand 1 1 0.4
Pakistan 11 24 12.6
Palau 8 28 4.6
Papua New Guinea 8 56 23.6
Philippines 15 52 29.8
Republic of Korea 10 17 16.9
Samoa 9 35 39.8
Singapore 4 4 0.7
Solomon Islands 7 57 53.6
Sri Lanka 4 38 7.1
Taiwan Province of China 8 42 4.1
Tajikistan 13 49 27.6
Thailand 8 33 4.9
Timor-Leste 10 83 6.6
Uzbekistan 7 15 10.3
Vanuatu 8 39 54.8
Viet Nam 11 50 16.8
Source:  World Bank, Doing Business 2009 (Washington D.C., 2009). 
Abbreviation: GNI, gross national income.16
It stands to reason that if it takes more than 100 working days to incorporate a new, 
small company in a country, then fewer entrepreneurs will take the plunge and embark 
on a business venture. A long delay in start-up also serves as a leading indicator that 
other, subsequent regulatory hassles associated with actually operating an SME (such 
as the granting of specific licences, tax appraisals or various site inspections) will also be 
onerous or problematic, thereby deterring entrepreneurs further.
Some observers have argued that the start-up phase for an SME usually lasts about 
3.5 years (or 42 months). If an SME passes that landmark date, then it has graduated 
beyond the critical period when most young companies tend to fail, and therefore can be 
regarded as a potentially sustainable business. Interestingly, the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor project has discerned a U-shape relationship between a country’s SME start-
ups and its level of economic development (as measured by per capita income) (Bosma 
2009). In relatively poor countries, the pace of SME start-ups can be quite impressive, but 
this pace then declines as the economy develops and more formal (salaried) employment 
opportunities evolve. Then, as the economy develops further, the pace of start-ups begins 
to increase again, as the domestic demand for services and goods rise, particularly for 
highly individualized items where economies of scale are of less relevance.  
1.2.2.   Survival: what does it take to advance beyond start-up? 
.The transformation from a low-income, traditional economy to a modern 
economy . . . involves significant changes to production methods, a process of 
change where entrepreneurs provide essential roles: first, in creating new firms 
[i.e. SMEs] outside of the household, which offer new products; and second, 
in growing firms by making use of scale economies. Such larger firms tend to 
specialize, and the clustering of specialized firms can give rise to localization 
economies, further encouraging innovation and specialization.
Wim Naudé (2008, 22).
Once an SME has successfully entered the market and commenced operations, a 
number of other factors will be critical in its subsequent performance, determining whether 
it can sustain its business model beyond the short term, and dictating whether it will be 
simply a survivor, or go on to prosper as a competitive entity. Those factors entail an 
interplay between the SME itself and its wider enabling environment. Key inputs include 
(but are not limited to) access to: (a) accurate and timely market information, and an 
ability to analyse that information in a meaningful way; (b) a range of appropriate financial 
resources; (c) high quality human capital; (d) technology; and (e) suitable premises. The 
more conducive the enabling environment; the more likely it is that SMEs will thrive.
In most cases, government agencies should not be in the business of providing 
these inputs directly to individual SMEs, as experience shows their ability to do so is mixed, 
and as such they can inadvertently undermine the development of more sustainable input 
providers. But policymakers do need to ensure that they are providing the kind of benign 
enabling environment that allows these inputs to be available, only stepping in directly 
when there is a clear inability of the private sector to provide such inputs, and for as briefly 
as necessary. 17
A good example is that of financing. In general, government agencies make bad 
bankers and private equity investors, as they lack the necessary expertise. But governments 
do need to ensure that SMEs have recourse to a spectrum of finance providers that offer 
a suitably diverse range of financial products and services. Bank loans tend to dominate 
this sphere, but high debt levels can sink an SME, and SMEs will be vulnerable if they rely 
too much on this kind of funding. If banks reduce their lending, or increase interest rates, 
then SMEs that rely too much on loans will suffer. It is therefore important that other pro-
SME forms of financing are available, such as financial leasing, factoring, private equity 
and angel investing. 
There is much that governments can do in this sphere, including: (a) ensuring that 
the regulatory framework pertaining to financing is supportive of SME-oriented funding, 
or at least does not constrain it; (b) catalyzing the creation and use of credit risk and 
scoring services that can radically reduce the perceived costs of lending to SMEs;10 and 
(c) ensuring that agencies such as secured transaction registries are available, to lessen 
the risks associated with SME lending.
Indeed,  improving  access  to  finance  is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  common 
interventions by policymakers and development partners in their efforts to support SME 
development. (For a profile of some of these, see Freeman 2005.) This is often because 
many respondents in diagnostic studies of SME development constraints perennially cite 
the common complaint that access to finance is inadequate. However, such responses 
need to be treated with some caution, as these comments can “often mask technical and 
managerial inadequacies” within SMEs (Gries and Naudé 2008a, 4). Rather, financing 
constraints play a more critical role later on, when operational SMEs are seeking to expand 
and develop, but lack access to sufficient long-term funding sources in particular.
Beyond debt financing, most commonly in the form of bank loans or a revolving 
overdraft  facility,  SMEs  often  struggle  to  identify  alternative  sources  of  funding,  and 
particularly long-term funding. Ideally, private equity/venture capital is seen as an attractive 
proposition, as it often comes with value-added post-investment technical assistance and 
business strategy guidance attached to it. (Rarely do banks provide much in the way of 
technical assistance attached to a loan.) But most SMEs are typically too small to be 
eligible for this kind of equity financing (let alone an initial public offering); the transaction 
costs of conducting such an investment are quite high, which in turn makes investments 
of less than $5 million often hard to justify or engineer. Only highly prospective SMEs, 
with perceived potential for steep growth, are likely to make the grade. One hybrid form 
of financing that has been developed to try and fill this “equity finance-cum-technical 
assistance” gap in SME funding has been that of business angels and business angel 
networks.  Here,  high  net-worth  individuals,  often  retired  after  a  successful  career  in 
a particular industry, take a personal equity stake in an SME and seek to mentor that 
business. This can be an attractive option for long-term funding support of SMEs. For 
more short-term funding needs, services like leasing and factoring also have very clear 
attractions as alternatives to “plain vanilla” debt financing.
10  SME-oriented lending is typically seen as having high transaction costs, relative to the amounts lent. This 
deters banks from lending to SMEs, and conversely lending activities are focused on bigger corporate 
clients. One way of lessening the transaction costs of things like credit appraisal and customer due 
diligence is to have credit scoring bureaus.18
The 2008 credit crunch: some initial considerations
The  recent  dramatic  events  in  global  banking  and  financial  markets 
throughout 2007 and 2008 will doubtless add to the financial constraints of SMEs 
in many Asia-Pacific economies in 2009-2010, even if the true severity of the 
impact is hard to gauge. Bank credit is the most common type of formal finance 
relied on by SMEs, and there is little doubt that bank credit—of all kinds—is 
almost certainly going to be scarcer in the near term.  
There is also likely to be a flight away from risk by financiers of all kinds, 
with regard to assets of all kinds, and SMEs will not be immune.  While there is 
some debate as to whether SME-related financing is more risky per se, or just 
entails a different kind of risk, we can expect bankers to be more discerning in 
their lending behaviour towards smaller firms. As credit becomes rationed, those 
SMEs most in need of funding are likely to be hardest hit, as bankers gravitate 
towards firms with an established track record of being credit worthy.
Of course, some SMEs are actually financed from personal loans (and 
even  mortgages)  taken  out  by  their  owners.  But  these  forms  of  credit  too 
will probably be less freely available in the near term. The anticipated global 
recession will also likely make it more difficult for individuals to provide loans to 
relatives, colleagues and friends, further tightening credit for the SMEs that rely 
on such informal financing.
The relatively small proportion of SMEs able to attract equity capital will 
also find the going harder. Private equity and venture capital companies will 
themselves find it harder to raise funding for investment, and will not be able to 
leverage their acquisitions as much.  With less equity capital available, deals 
will be scarcer, and the internal rates of return expectations of investors will be 
higher.
Although not specific to SME finance per se, the Milken Institute produces an 
annual survey of countries and their access to capital for business, entitled the Capital 
Access Index. The index is comprised of 56 different measures, grouped under seven 
categories: (a) macroeconomic environment; (b) institutional environment; (c) financial 
and banking institutions; (d) equity market development; (e) bond market development; (f) 
alternative sources of capital; and (g) international funding.11 Not all of these groupings are 
wholly appropriate to SME financing, but a, b, c and f are highly relevant. At present, 122 
economies are included in the Capital Access Index, and those located in the Asia-Pacific 
region are shown in table 7, along with their aggregate score and ranking for 2007.
11  For details of the methodology used, see Appendix A of the report, which can be downloaded at:   
www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/publications.taf.19




Country rank in 
2007 (out of 122 
countries)





New Zealand 7.00 18
Republic of Korea 6.87 19






Sri Lanka 4.11 70
Pakistan 4.06 72
Viet Nam 3.98 74




Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2.11 119
Source:  James R. Barth, Tong Li, Wenling Lu, Triphon Phumiwasana and Glenn Yago, Capital Access 
Index  2007:  Best  Markets  for  Business Access  to  Capital,  (Santa  Monica,  Milken  Institute, 
2008).
But access to finance is by no means the only determinant of a conducive business 
enabling environment. Good governance and minimal red tape can also be an important 
determinant as the corollary, that is, burdensome bureaucracy and corruption, can be a 
major disincentive for entrepreneurial endeavour. This is not to suggest that an economy 
should seek to completely do away with necessary regulation and oversight, as this is still 
required to ensure that SMEs and other business ventures do not pursue activities that are 
detrimental to society, the environment, the wider economy, and so on. Ex ante approvals, 
as well as inspections and other forms of ex post regulatory oversight, are inevitable, at 
least in some fields of business that SMEs will pursue. But where such regulations and 
their implementation are gratuitous in nature and entail an unnecessary compliance cost 
or opportunity cost for SMEs, they will serve as an inhibitor of business.  20
This can sometimes stem from a desire by State agency officials to extract additional 
“rents”  from  businesses,  including  SMEs.  Transparency  International  undertakes  an 
annual Corruption Perceptions Index exercise that scores and ranks economies according 
to the perceived level of corruption. Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with 
the methodology used to generate such indices, the perceived level of corruption will be a 
factor in any decision made to pursue a business, even among start-up, domestic SMEs, 
as it raises the spectre of heightened costs and business risk. Table 8 includes those Asia-
Pacific economies included in the 2008 iteration of the index.








New Zealand 1 Maldives 115
Singapore 4 Nepal 121
Australia 9 Viet Nam 121
Hong Kong, China 12 Indonesia 126
Japan 18 Philippines 141
Taiwan Province of China 39 Kazakhstan 145
Republic of Korea 40 Timor-Leste 145
Bhutan 45 Bangladesh 147
Malaysia 47 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
151
Samoa 62 Papua New Guinea 151
China 72 Tajikistan 151
Thailand 80 Azerbaijan 158
India 85 Cambodia 166
Sri Lanka 92 Kyrgyzstan 166
Kiribati 96 Turkmenistan 166
Mongolia 102 Uzbekistan 166
Solomon Islands 109 Myanmar 178
Vanuatu 109
Source:  Transparency  International,  Transparency  International  2008  Corruption  Perceptions  Index 
(Berlin, Ernst & Young Global Limited, 2008), available at www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi/2008.
One  area  where  bureaucracy  can  often  be  particularly  burdensome,  notably 
for  manufacturing-related  SMEs,  is  in  the  area  of  land  acquisition/availability  and 
construction. Firms that are unable to find and develop adequate premises may not be 
able to commence operations, or may remain constrained at a sub-optimal size that 
prevents  them  from  developing  economies  of  scale  and  renders  them  uncompetitive 
with their peers. Hence, there is a need for policymakers to ensure that adequate land 21
is available for SMEs to establish viable operations, and that access to this land—and 
registering legitimate ownership rights—is not hindered by excessive red tape and/or 
corrupt practices. The same imperative pertains to the provision of construction permits 
and all the other approvals that an SME might require before erecting and inhabiting new 
premises. Industrial zones and incubators (addressed in more detail below), where some 
of the normal procedures can be circumvented, may provide part of the answer. However, 
it is hardly conducive to SME development, particularly in the broad field of manufacturing, 
when, as in some economies, it takes up to a year to complete the 25 or more regulatory 
steps necessary to commission a new building.
A similar issue pertains to the taxation of SMEs. A regulatory system that makes 
tax compliance unduly burdensome can create a major distraction and opportunity cost 
for the typically small number of managers and/or owners of an SME. Further, a tax 
regime that is overly complex or opaque in its administration and enforcement serves to 
make the risks of pursuing business far greater. Any sustainable business model requires 
some calculation of (after tax) profitability and internal rate of return, but that becomes 
hard to achieve if the tax liability of an SME is hard to forecast or unknown. Complex or 
inequitable tax regimes can also have a distortionary effect on the development of SMEs, 
as they are tempted to morph into forms that seem to offer a lower tax burden. But if the 
tax regime itself changes, as is often the case, then an SME can be rendered unviable 
because it was reliant on some prior tax ruling, and now finds itself with an unsustainable 
business model.  
Simplicity, consistency and predictability tend to be the best watchwords for pro-
business (and pro-SME) tax regimes and their enforcement. Recognizing that the tax 
regime, bureaucracy, licensing and other regulatory compliance elements for SMEs are 
often less than ideal, there is a common tendency for policymakers to offer incentives 
and other kinds of inducements, intended to offset these additional compliance costs and 
risks, rather like a palliative. On their part, SMEs that are surveyed will rarely say that they 
dislike tax or other incentive measures offered by the government, as they do offer some 
pragmatic value. But where the doling out of incentives makes the regulatory regime 
more  complex,  and  therefore  often  harder  to  implement  fairly  and  transparently,  the 
consequences can actually backfire. SMEs and potential entrepreneurs see a regulatory 
regime that is even more laden with risk and uncertainty, and opt not to pursue business 
ventures for fear of encountering obstacles that are not readily apparent or that are hard 
to predict in terms of their impact.
A  slightly  more  controversial  issue  is  that  relating  to  employment  regulations, 
and the relative ease with which SMEs can hire, oversee and fire staff while remaining 
legally compliant. For example, there may be limits in the local labour code or law on the 
number of hours that employees may work per day or week. There may be a minimum 
number of weeks’ salary that an employee is entitled to when laid off, or other regulatory 
requirements that must be fulfilled before an SME can make an employee redundant. As 
with regulations pertaining to the environment, there is a need to balance the interests of 
SMEs with that of the wider economy and society. If the regulatory regime is too onerous, 
then a country is in danger of regulating its business community, including SMEs, out of 
business. Yet a too passive regulatory regime towards business can see damage inflicted 
that is not conducive to sustainable development.22
For SMEs in less developed countries, and small economies in particular (such 
as  the  island  economies  of  the  Pacific,  or  the  landlocked  economies  of  Bhutan,  the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Nepal), another key determinant of long-term 
success—for SME development and sustained economic growth in general—is the ability 
to export products or services, which increasingly involve parts and components. Indeed, 
most firms will probably, sooner or later, aspire to serve international customers. And 
even SMEs that are wholly oriented towards a domestic market may need to import some 
items. In this context, the ability of firms to buy and sell relatively easily across national 
borders is another essential prerequisite for SME development, particularly in the context 
of the globalization of production, as will be discussed in section 2.  
In general, SMEs typically cannot thrive in splendid isolation. Rather, they need to 
be part of a wider and vibrant corporate community, both domestically and internationally, 
into which they can be integrated and burgeon. It is the free flow of information, finance, 
human capital, skills, technology and other key inputs, between SMEs and other members 
of the wider economy and corporate community, that allows individual SMEs to find their 
competitive niches, and to be successful. This “traffic” of inputs can be facilitated and 
promoted through various platforms and vehicles, particularly in developing countries. One 
such vehicle is foreign direct investment, whereby more technically advanced overseas 
firms can assist local SMEs through backward linkages of various kinds. (This is explored 
in greater detail in the fourth section of this study.)  
Another platform is business associations, which should allow members to pool and 
share information. Business associations may be centred on a particular location (such 
as a city or province), a particular industry or product, or a slightly more abstract shared 
goal or interest of some kind. Business incubators and clusters are another platform, 
often structured as public-private (or purely private) partnerships. The aim is to allow 
multiple SMEs to benefit from economies, synergies and other benefits derived from being 
located together. Indeed, there is a considerable research literature surrounding the issue 
of incubators and clusters for SME development, based on initiatives and experiences 
undertaken across the globe. As the term suggests, incubators are designed to help 
youthful enterprises make it through the first, critical stages of business development, as 
they seek to graduate to the level of a sustainable business.12
It should be borne in mind, however, that not all SMEs aspire to become larger 
enterprises. Many owners of SMEs wish to keep their business small in scale, for whatever 
reason. This may be because it is a family business, and the owner(s) wish to keep it that 
way. It may be because the SME supports a lifestyle that is deemed comfortable and 
adequate, so there is no need to aspire to anything more grand. Or it could be because 
an SME-owner worries about the so-called “tall poppy syndrome”, whereby larger firms 
attract unwelcome attention of various kinds, so feels it is better to remain small. Or this 
may be because the business model itself is not easily expandable (sometimes referred 
to as scalable), for whatever reason, and will remain a small, niche player.
12  However, not all SMEs are attracted to clusters or incubators, despite the apparent economies and 
value-added inputs that may be on offer. One reason may be that, in being located so close to other 
firms of a similar kind, SME owners worry that key employees will be more easily tempted away by rival 
companies, or that commercially sensitive information is more likely to leak out in the canteen or other 
shared space.23
1.2.3. Exit: what can we learn from the demise of SMEs ?
“. . . most firms die young”. 
R. Cressy (2006)
Turning now to SME exits, there are perhaps two scenarios we need to consider. 
The first is that an SME develops into a large enterprise, and therefore graduates beyond 
the SME sector. For all concerned, this is perhaps the most welcome outcome for an SME 
in most cases. The second is the actual demise and closure of an SME, for whatever 
reason. (As Headd (2003) notes, not all SME closures stem from business failure; some 
are the consequence of an orderly exit by the owner(s).)
The latter is undoubtedly a much less welcome outcome than the former, in most 
cases, but it should not be dismissed as a policy irrelevance. It is inevitable that not all 
SMEs will be successful ad infinitum. Some will have an early demise, while others may 
close after quite a considerable time. In general, at least half of all new companies close 
within two years of commencing operations. One study in the United States found that 40 
per cent of manufacturing firms were defunct within five years of beginning operations. 
And there is clearly little utility in allocating resources that seek to artificially prolong 
the life of a terminally ill SME. Rather, the important issue for policymakers to ensure is 
that their passing does not become a constraint on new SMEs emerging, and hopefully 
some (hard) lessons learned are disseminated into the collective awareness of the local 
business community. A form of knowledge management process, if you will.
While countries are often quite zealous at recording and reporting new company 
start-ups, they tend to be much less focused on recording company closures. Thus, in 
some countries, the “births” of SMEs are diligently counted, but the “deaths” of most failed 
SMEs go completely unrecorded. This is the case in Viet Nam. In fact, few companies in 
Viet Nam actually go through the regulatory process of formally closing. Instead, many 
go into a state of suspended animation, which has the attraction of being able to revive 
the company at a later stage, should conditions change for the better. Also, the fact that 
it can take five years to formally close a bankrupt company serves as a deterrent against 
officially closing a company. But this then makes it difficult for business service providers, 
including banks and financiers, to have a clear picture of the SME community. This in turn 
adds to the risks for service providers of various kinds, which are passed on to SMEs as 
higher fees. For example, banks will charge a higher rate of interest on loans to SMEs, to 
mitigate the higher risks associated with such opacity. Equity financiers will expect a higher 
rate of return on their investment to mitigate the same higher perceived risk. Perhaps the 
most comprehensive and accurate picture of the SME community in a developing country 
is held by the tax authority, but this information is rarely in the public domain, or even 
shared among pertinent government agencies.
Returning  once  again  to  the  Doing  Business  survey,  problems  encountered 
in undergoing company bankruptcy are measured and compared, in terms of: (a) the 
average time to complete the bankruptcy process; (b) the average cost of this process; 
and (c) the recovery rate (how many cents on the dollar claimants can expect to recover 
from an insolvent company). The results for economies in the Asia-Pacific region are 
shown in table 9.24










 (cents on 
the dollar)
Average for East Asia and the Pacific 2.7 23.2 28.4
Average for South Asia 5.0 6.5 19.9
Afghanistan - - 0.0
Australia 1.0 8.0 78.8
Azerbaijan 2.7 8.0 30.1
Bangladesh 4.0 8.0 23.2
Bhutan - - 0.0
Brunei 2.5 4.0 47.2
Cambodia - - 0.0
China 1.7 22.0 35.3
Fiji 1.8 38.0 20.1
Hong Kong, China 1.1 9.0 79.8
India 10.0 9.0 10.4
Indonesia 5.5 18 13.7
Japan 0.6 4.0 92.5
Kazakhstan 3.3 18.0 25.3
Kiribati - - 0.0
Kyrgyzstan 4.0 15 14.2
Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - 0.0
Malaysia 2.3 15.0 38.6
Maldives 6.7 4.0 18.2
Marshall Islands 2.0 38.0 17.9
Micronesia (Federated States of) 5.3 38 3.5
Mongolia 4.0 8.0 22.0
Nepal 5.0 9.0 24.5
New Zealand 1.3 4.0 76.2
Pakistan 2.8 4.0 39.2
Palau 1.0 23.0 38.2
Papua New Guinea 3.0 23.0 24.7
Philippines 5.7 38.0 4.4
Republic of Korea 1.5 4.0 80.5
Samoa 2.5 38.0 14.325
Source:  World Bank, Doing Business 2009 (Washington D.C., World Bank, 2009).
Singapore 0.8 1.0 91.3
Solomon Islands 1.0 38.0 23.6
Sri Lanka 1.7 5.0 43.4
Taiwan Province of China 1.9 4.0 80.9
Tajikistan 3.0 9.0 25.4
Thailand 2.7 36.0 42.4
Timor-Leste - - 0.0
Uzbekistan 4.0 10.0 18.7
Vanuatu 2.6 38 41.2
Viet Nam 5.0 15.0 18.0
Clearly, the relative ease with which a bankrupt SME can be wound up, and the 
amount that claimants (creditors, employees and tax agencies) can recover, have an impact 
on the perceived risk of SMEs. This in turn will influence the extent to which subsequent 
SMEs can access key inputs, most notably finance. In Singapore, for example, where a 
bankrupt SME can be wound up in less than a year, and claimants have a recovery rate 
of over 90 per cent on average, there is going to be a far greater likelihood that banks will 
lend to SMEs, compared with Cambodia or the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, for 
example, where the bankruptcy process is virtually non-existent. In the latter countries, 
banks will be much more conservative in lending to SMEs, knowing that they will have little 
or no chance of recovering the loan amount should the borrower become bankrupt. Little 
wonder, therefore, that Singapore ranks far higher than Cambodia or the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, for example, in the Milken Institute’s Capital Access Index.
There is a relatively strong correlation between the ease of access a SME has 
to capital and the degree to which: (a) investors are protected; and (b) contracts can be 
enforced in a particular country. One often tends to think of investor protection within the 
wider context of corporate governance, and for larger, stock-market-listed companies in 
particular, where there is a need to ensure that the management of the company is working 
in the interests of what can be a very widespread shareholder base, including many 
minority shareholders. But it also applies to many SMEs also, even if their shareholder 
base is quite small indeed. The Doing Business survey assesses investor protection in 
terms of: (a) the transparency of transactions; (b) liability for self-dealing; and (c) the 
ability of shareholders to sue directors and officers for misconduct. This may not seem 
particularly relevant to most SMEs, but the manner with which a company conducts its 
activities and governs its internal practices, and the extent to which stakeholders have 
some legal recourse in cases of improper behaviour, are the sorts of issues that banks will 
focus on when appraising SME loan applicants.  
The same broad dynamic pertains to contract enforcement, as a bank will be less 
willing and able to provide capital to an SME if it knows that a loan default will be difficult 
(costly, time-consuming or involving an uncertain outcome) to pursue by conventional 
legal means, notably in terms of taking possession of and liquidating any assets pledged 
as collateral. This is often made apparent in the selective regard banks have for collateral, 
only willing to take pledges on assets that can be easily sold.26
1.3.  Gender issues relating to SME development
Relatively little research has been conducted on gender issues in SME development 
within the Asia-Pacific region. One exception is a survey by Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor on women and entrepreneurship, albeit on a global level. The most recent such 
survey, using 2007 data, but published in a 2008 report, spans 41 economies, including 
just six in Asia: China; Hong Kong, China; India; Japan; Kazakhstan; and Thailand. Based 
on earlier research, it is posited that “… investment in women’s entrepreneurship is an 
important way for countries to exponentially increase the impact of new venture creation. 
Ignoring the proven potential of women’s entrepreneurial activity means that countries put 
themselves at a disadvantage and thwart their opportunity to increase economic growth”. 
(Allen and others 2008, 6)
In general, there tends to be a gender gap between male-owned SMEs and female-
owned SMEs, although some countries seem to have attained a broad gender balance, 
including Japan and Thailand (Allen and others 2008, 7). Indeed, in Japan, 2007 saw 
more women than men starting up new businesses (table 10). That gender asymmetry 
pertains to both newly established firms and more mature SMEs. Efforts to rectify this 
asymmetry will, in most cases, need to be country-specific in nature, addressing specific 
socio-cultural and/or economic factors that are identified as constraining the development 
of more SMEs owned and managed by women. One example is the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Viet Nam, and its project regarding a 
women’s entrepreneurship development programme in the food industry in Central Viet 
Nam, working in conjunction with the national Women’s Union in three provinces:
In many places in Viet Nam, men traditionally work in the fields and women process 
the agricultural products. As the economy was opened to the flow of goods from 
outside,  the  existence  of  this  traditional  occupation  for  women  was  put  under 
threat. There are hundreds of women involved in the business of food processing 
in Danang but many had to give up in the face of severe competition from other 
products of higher quality. For many of them, a new hope arrived with UNIDO’s 
project that provides skill development in business management, marketing and 
food processing technology. 
A rural resource centre at the Danang Women’s Union Vocational Training Center 
has  been  established  as  a  functional,  active  and  viable  centre  where  food-
processing women entrepreneurs can come for information, training and advice. 
Entrepreneurial  and  technology  training  modules  in  Vietnamese  and  English 
suited to the local needs of women entrepreneurs in the Central Region are in 
use. Trainers have been trained from the Viet Nam Women’s Union and other 
institutions. Women are organized in self-help groups in order to address specific 
constraints  such  as:  marketing  strategies  and  competitiveness;  access  to  raw 
materials, machinery and equipment, technology, finance, training and advisory 
services. With additional funds from Belgium, the project has recently embarked on 
the introduction of a lease-purchase service for the self-help groups. The women 
entrepreneurs are already linked to Belgium’s micro credit facility implemented by 
the Women’s Union. (UNIDO 2003)
Another example would be the Micro-Enterprise Development Programme of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Nepal, which, although not focused 27
exclusively on women entrepreneurs, has been markedly oriented towards women. Both 
the central Viet Nam and Nepal projects, and other projects focused on supporting women 
as entrepreneurs, stem in large part from the Beijing Declaration13 of 1995, and tend to 
focus more on micro- and small enterprises, as part of poverty alleviation goals.
1.4.  Cradle to grave: the role of policymakers and development   
  partners in supporting the SME sector
Policymakers in developing countries and development partners tend to place 
special attention on SME sector development, for reasons discussed above. In recent 
years, such interventions have tended to shift away from direct (and often subsidized) 
support to individual SMEs, which can bring undesired market distorting risks, and more 
towards economy- and market-wide initiatives that are market-oriented in nature.  
Pro-SME development interventions in developing countries tend to focus on those 
issues where SMEs have most problems of access, including (but not always limited to): 
(a) access to finance; (b) access to land; (c) access to business support services; (d) 
access to markets, especially overseas markets; (e) access to training and guidance; and 
(f) access to technology and infrastructure.14
The  schema  outlined  in  table  11  tries  to  profile  some  of  the  more  common 
interventions used for pro-SME development, in line with best practice, although it is not 
exhaustive in scope. In practice, of course, there tends to be quite a lot of overlap between 
the various components in this SME development smorgasbord.
13  Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995 (United Nations 
publication, Sales. No. E.96.IV.13), chap. I, resolution 1, annex I.
14  For a cogent summary, see chapter 7 of the Best Practice Guide for a Positive Business and Investment 
Climate (OSCE 2006).









Male Female Male Female Male Female
China 19.3 13.4 9.7 7.0 28.9 20.5
Hong Kong, China 14.3 5.8 7.5 3.8 21.8 9.6
India 9.5 7.5 8.7 2.2 18.2 9.7
Japan 3.5 5.2 8.7 8.6 12.2 13.8
Kazakhstan 11.2 7.6 6.8 4.8 18.0 12.4
Source:   I. Elaine Allen, Amanda Elam, Nan Langowitz and Monica Dean, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2007 Report on Women and Entrepreneurship (Global Entrepreneurship Research Association, 
2008), available at www.gemconsortium.org.
(Percentage)28
Table 11.  Matrix of common SME development interventions
Group Intervention
Training and information Encouragement  of  a  culture  of  entrepreneurship  in 
schools,  vocational  colleges  and  institutes  of  higher 
education
Train-the-trainers programmes of various kinds
SME  and  business  guidance  publications  of  various 
kinds (on marketing and exporting to overseas markets, 
for example)
Applied vocational training for employees of SMEs
Information technology and distance-learning programmes 
for SME owners
Training and guidance tailored for women entrepreneurs
Financial services Micro-loans and SME-oriented loan/debt products
Factoring
Leasing
Venture capital and private equity
Angels and angel networks
Secured transactions and registry
Guarantee mechanisms of various kinds
Credit scoring and ratings agencies
Bankruptcy legislation
Support structures Incubators (including virtual incubators)
Clusters  and  technology  centres  of  various  kinds, 
including those linked to universities
Business associations
Infrastructure of various kinds and access to land
Business-to-business  (B2B)  portals  and  e-business 
platforms
Policy advocacy for a 
conducive business 
enabling environment
Private sector and SME development in general, including 
investment promotion
Government procurement
Taxation issues (for example, simplified tax regime)
Trade issues
Permitted forms of doing business
Other  regulations  in  pertinent  fields  (for  example, 
labour and land, zoning, dispute resolution and contract 
enforcement)29
Intellectual  property  rights  and  other  private  property 
rights
Electronic commerce regulations
Competition policy and legislation
Reducing regulatory burdens of various kinds, so as to 
lessen compliance costs
Corporate governance
Corporate social responsibility and sustainable business
Capacity-building For  relevant  state  agencies  (such  as  conducting 
regulatory impact assessments or speeding up customs 
procedures)
For new and existing business associations, so that they 
become sustainable
For  providers  of  business  development  service  (for 
example  accountants, marketing firms, human resources, 
testing)
For markets of various kinds
Within  SMEs  themselves  (such  as  in  management  or 
technical skills, and turning entrepreneurs into successful 
business people)
Such interventions are typically enacted on a country-by-country basis, coordinated 
between the relevant government agencies and multiple development partners. There are 
some examples of regional and subregional initiatives, such as the Mekong Private Sector 
Development Facility, and the SouthAsia Enterprise Development Facility. Both are multi-
donor initiatives managed by the International Finance Corporation, but here too there is 
often a country-specific approach taken to individual initiatives that are pursued in areas 
such as the business enabling environment.
Hallberg (2000, 8) is probably right in asserting that: 
An SME development strategy is in reality . . . a “private sector development 
strategy”,  recognizing  that  the  majority  of  firms  are  small,  that  they  may  face 
different  constraints  and  opportunities  than  large  firms,  and  that  the  types  of 
institutions and instruments best suited to their needs may be underprovided in 
distorted and segmented markets. It points government action toward market-
completing interventions and the elimination of policy biases by: 
•   Addressing the market failures that create cost disadvantages for SMEs, restrict 
their access to markets, and inhibit the development of markets for a diverse 
range of financial and non-financial services appropriate for small firms; 
•   Improving  transactional  efficiency  in  financial,  product,  and  input  markets 
relevant  to  SMEs,  by  facilitating  access  to  information  and  developing 
mechanisms to manage risk; 30
•   Reconsidering public policies and regulations that discriminate against small firms 
or produce fixed costs that create a competitive disadvantage for them; and 
•   Investing  in  public  goods  that  open  market  access  and  build  enterprise 
competitiveness—including infrastructure (information, communications, power, 
water, and transport) as well as education and technology development.
At  perhaps  its  most  “Austrian  School”-lite,  purist  form,  this  approach  almost 
entails  keeping  away  from  quasi-interventionist  SME  development  initiatives  per  se, 
and instead focusing on trying to create—and then maintain—the key external enabling 
factors necessary for competitive SMEs to thrive. These are, most notably: (a) strong 
property rights protection and contract enforcement; (b) a stable macroeconomic and 
financial  environment,  with  low  inflation  and  currency  convertibility;  (c)  a  competition 
policy that allows everyone to pursue business opportunities; (d) socio-political stability; 
(e) regulatory and policy consistency, and an avoidance of “shocks”; (f) tax rates that are 
not too burdensome; (g) good governance and transparency, including low corruption 
levels; and (h) robust and competent State institutions for effective implementation and 
enforcement of all the above.  
Of course, this is not a check-list for SME development only, but for a favourable 
business and investment climate for firms of all sizes and ownership profiles. One can 
work diligently to overcome a relatively small-scale (but therefore removable) obstacle 
that is perceived to be constraining SME development, but may have relatively little impact 
in the big scheme if more generic business environment issues, such as a malfunctioning 
tax regime (which is much harder to address), go unreformed. Diminishing returns can 
rapidly set in for pro-SME initiatives that incrementally shave off time or money costs 
for business start-up procedures, if bigger—and therefore often harder to surmount—
obstacles persist.
Another fairly common approach taken by development partners is to support one 
or more State agencies mandated to coordinate SME-related development policies in a 
particular country. By building up the capacity of such bodies, it should be possible for 
the host country itself to lead efforts aimed at creating a more vibrant SME community. 
But evidence to support the attainment of this objective varies from country to country. 
One risk here is that the relevant State agencies end up becoming a burden on local 
SMEs, rather than a source of support. Rather than becoming effective exponents of SME 
sector development within the government, they burgeon into bodies focused on their own 
self-sustenance, and divert scarce resources away from the SMEs they are supposed to 
be helping. Given the choice, most successful SME owners in developing countries are 
merely looking for a safe and level playing field on which to conduct business, and are 
not particularly looking for special treatment. Nonetheless, many developing countries 
have  opted  to  establish  SME  development  agencies  of  one  kind  or  another,  and  of 
varying degrees of effectiveness. However, international development partners should be 
discerning in their approach to such agencies.
The pursuit of clusters and incubators to support SME development tends to be a 
relatively large-scale exercise, and one that typically needs a fairly strong degree of private 
sector involvement to be meaningful and sustainable, and therefore attractive to SMEs. 
In Viet Nam, for example, the first two incubator projects enacted in Hanoi (agricultural 31
processing and packaging) and Ho Chi Minh City (software), supported with European 
Commission funding, have experienced only qualified success. The concept of industry 
and product clusters has also been attempted in Viet Nam by a few development partners, 
including the Viet Nam Competitiveness Initiative funded by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), but the gains derived seem to have been fairly 
limited, at best. In Mongolia, USAID attempted a cluster development initiative around 
meat, cashmere and tourism, also without much success. The apparent experience of 
Viet Nam and Mongolia contrasts with that of markedly more successful incubators and 
clusters in some other developing and transitional countries, notably in Eastern Europe. 
This issue will be revisited in more detail in the next section of this report.
In general, one finds policymakers and development partners active in most areas 
of SME development. The sphere is typically well covered by initiatives of various kinds, 
with varying degrees of success. As noted above, an area that is typically well supported 
is removing constraints to market entry, as: (a) this is an important prerequisite of SME 
development; (b) the interventions required can be relatively simple and attainable; and 
(c) the positive impact can be easily measured and assessed. The number of approvals 
required, agency office visits, official and unofficial costs, and days required to start a 
business (and be compliant with the law in commencing operations) can all be reduced 
in many developing countries. One-stop shops of various kinds have become a fairly 
common initiative in this field, even if they consist of multiple entrances, windows and 
even “back doors”. Similarly, the establishment of business associations, commonly along 
business sector lines, is often pursued, although making such associations genuinely 
effective and economically sustainable in the long run is not always easy.
In short, such interventions often tend to be “low-hanging fruit” for policymakers 
and development partners. Conversely, some other, perhaps less readily tangible, factors 
relating to SME development attract less attention, partly because the positive impact 
arising is less immediate. But such “high-hanging fruit” may actually have a greater long-
term economic development impact, if, for example, it allows local SMEs to establish 
greater linkages with the foreign investment enterprise community, or to export much better. 
As a consequence, such interventions can have a greater impact on, among other things, 
employment (and poverty alleviation), foreign exchange earnings and addressing socio-
economic and gender imbalances of various kinds. In other words, supporting SMEs that 
they may graduate from survival to competitive (or sustainable) status.  Having navigated 
through the market entry process, an SME may survive for quite some time, without really 
attaining a level where it can be deemed a success. This is where SME support is perhaps 
most necessary in many developing countries, but also harder to achieve (and measure). 
Sections 2 and 3 of this report focus largely on this aspect. Section 4 of the report includes 
some specific policy recommendations on alternative SME development initiatives that 
could reap dividends.